Violence in context: Mapping the strategies and operational art of irregular warfare

The malaise that the United States, and the West, have experienced in recent campaigns stems in large part from unclear thinking about war, its political essence, and the strategies needed to join the two. Instead, analysis and response are predicated on entrenched theoretical concepts with limited practical utility. The inadequacy of understanding has spawned new, and not so new, terms to capture unanticipated trends, starting with the re-discovery of “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” and leading to discussion of “hybrid threats” and “gray-zone” operations. New terminology can help, but the change must go deeper. Challenging analytical orthodoxy, this article sets out a unifying approach for the study of political violence, or more accurately: violent politics. It provides a conceptual foundation that helps to make sense of recent shifts in warfare. In effect, it offers sorely needed theoretical insights into the nature of strategy and guides the process of responding to nontraditional threats.     

ISIS’s Warfare Functions: A Systematized Review of a Proto-state’s Conventional Conduct of Combat Operations

This article gives an overall assessment of ISIS’s conventional conduct of combat operations by examining their warfighting functions patterns. In sum, the approach of ISIS comprised fundamental principles: their weapons can be organized into categories, purposeful combination of these forces in keeping with the concept of combined arms combat, and hierarchical command and control executed by experienced commanders. ISIS combat groups combined the elements of formation and firepower as well as movement and mobility. The paper concludes that ISIS obviously had a vast range of conventional capabilities at its disposal and was thus able to conduct major operations.     

Reforming the bras tendus? The Congolese National Police reforms, 2003–2016

The security sector reform (SSR) programme in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has failed, according to a former high-level member of the United Nations (UN) mission in the DRC, as a large section of the country remains outside government control, and the security institutions of the state continue to constitute one of the predominant sources of insecurity for the local population in a number of ways. Based on several field studies, this article critically scrutinises the SSR of the Congolese National Police (Police nationale congolaise; PNC) and the efforts to reform it between 2004 and 2016. It further attempts to explain why so little progress was made in the SSR of the PNC, despite extensive involvement from donors. The article shows that the instrumental and traditional approach to SSR is partly to blame, because in this case it failed to address the root problems and initiate the needed fundamental reform and reconstruction of the police force. It also shows that reforming local security institutions becomes even more difficult when the local authorities do not support the effort.     

Spaghetti: systems thinking and the US Army

In the mid-2000s, the United States Army was embroiled in counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan that required deeper understanding of local social systems. The Army turned to systems thinking and design thinking to model and understand the world, define problems, and develop approaches to strategic and operational challenges. However, the Army’s approach as expressed in publications and doctrine encourages the development of complicated, unsupported, and unfalsifiable hypotheses. The risk is that the Army will act on incorrect assumptions and develop plans that are fragile.